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Notes and Comments
SHIFTING TRENDS IN BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF
PROOF:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MALIMATH COMMITTEE REPORT
Pooja Garg'

This note discusses the recommendations of the Committee on
Reforms of the Criminal Justice System (Malimath Committee,
2003) in respect of burden ofproofand standardofproof in criminal
law. The note first examines the concepts of burden of proof and
standardof!proofand the various meanings attachedto them. It then
argues that the Malimath Committee has misread these various
meanings. The second part of this note examines in detail the various
standardsofproof applicablein criminallaw. The note suggests that
the presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonabledoubt are
not only entrenched in the criminaljustice system of India but are
also a part offundamental rights guaranteedunder Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. This note, concludes by suggesting that if the
recommendationsof the Malimath Committee were to be adopted in
respect of burden and standardof proof in criminal law, it is likely
that it would not only be struck down as unconstitutionalbut would
also be in violation of India's internationalobligations under the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Ministry of Home Affairs constituted the Committee on Reforms of the Criminal
Justice System ("Malimath Committee") on November 24, 2000. The Committee,
headed by Justice V.S. Malimath, former Chief Justice of the Karnataka and Kerala
High Courts, had the task of examining the fundamental principles of criminal law so
as to restore confidence in the criminal justice system.' This involved reviewing the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("Cr.P.C"), the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
("I.E.A"), and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("I.P.C")3 The Committee's mandate was
to address the arrears of criminal cases, delayin disposal of criminal cases and the low
rate of conviction in cases involving serious crimes.
The terms of reference for the Malimath Committee4 suggest an onerous task in
revamping the entire criminal justice system. The Malimath Committee was required
to carefully analyse the fundamental principles of criminal law enshrined in the
Constitution of India. Further, the Malimath Committee was required to examine
whether there was a need to re-draft the I.P.C, Cr.P.C and the LEA The other terms
of reference required the Committee to make suggestions to allow for expedient
disposal of cases and to ensure that the Judiciary, Prosecution and police work
together to "restore the confidence of the common man in the criminal justice
system." 5 Interestingly enough, the notification constituting the Committee does not
expressly state the reasons for its creation, which fact also finds mention in the
Malimath Committee Report itself. In the Malimath Committee's opinion, the
purpose of establishing the Malimath Committee is self-evident since the criminal
justice system is on the verge of collapse,6
The Malimath Committee sent a detailed questionnaire to over 3000 persons including
lawyers, police officers, government officials, forensic scientists and legal luminaries
1 This is the opinion of the Committee expressed in paragraph 1.3 of the V.S. MALIMATI-I ET
AL., REPORT OF

THE COMITTEE ON REFORMS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

1.3

(2003) [hereinafter MAuMATH ColwTEE REPORT] where it is stated that the inordinate
delay in disposal of criminal cases and the low rate of conviction has resulted in loss of
confidence of the citizens in the existing criminal justice system.
2 Id.

1.6.

3 MAuMATh-i COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, 1.3.
4 Id. I 1.1.
MALIMATH COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 1, 1.1.
6

Id.

1.3.
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out of which only 284 responses were received by the Malimath Committee. aearly,
such a poor response cannot be considered a countrywide consultation. Further, the
quesionnaire was distributed to experts and not the public at large. At the outset,
therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the Malimath Committee Report is in
no way a reflection of what the 'cormon man' desires of the criminal justice system.
Interestingly, the task that the Committee was faced with had from time to tune
deliberated upon by several other Committees. The National Police Commission
made several recommendations between 1979 and 1981 for reducing political
interference in the functioning of the police and decrease torture in police custody.
The National Human Rights Commission has also suggested reforms to the criminal
justice system using a human rights approach.7 The approach of these two
Corniittees has been to safeguard the human rights of the victims and the accused
respectively The Malimath Committee considers the presumption of innocence as a
hindrance in increasing conviction rates and it is this perspective that guides the
recommendations made by the Committee.8
The Malimath Committee Report was submitted to the Government of India in April
2003. It has sparked off debates as regards the rights of the accused. Human rights
activists claim that the implementation of the Malimath Committee Report will negate
the rights that have accrued to the accused over centuries in almost all civilized
nations. One of the most debated areas has been the recommendation in respect of
lowering the standard of proof and shifting the burden of proof in a criminal trial.
This note seeks to examine the Malimath Committee's recommendations on the
aspect of burden of proof and standard of proof applied in the criminal justice system.
It is submitted that the recommendations, if implemented, would violate the
fundamental rights of persons under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India in addition
to being against India's international obligations under the International Covenant on
Gvil and Political Rights ("I.CCP."). The endeavour is to analyse how these
concepts ('burden of proof' and 'standard of proof') and emerging trends affect the
rights of the accused and whether the departure suggested by the Malimath
Committee Report is in accordance with the well established fundamental principles
of the criminal justice system, and in particular, the presumption of innocence.
Part I of the note discusses the various meanings of the term 'burden of proof' and
the effect of 'reverse onus clauses' and presumptions in various criminal statutes.
7

8

Siddharth Narain, Rights and Criminaljustice, FRONTLINE, Aug. 30, 2003, available at
hrtp://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2018/stories/20030912001708!300.htm (last visited June
9, 2005).
Upendra Baxi, An Honest Citizen's Guide to CriminalJustice System Reform: A Critique
of the Mahmath Report, in THE REPORT OF AMNsY INTERNATIONAL INDIA, ThiE
(MALIMATH) COMMITTEE ON REFORMS OF CRIMINAL JusiCF SYSTEMNPouncs AND IMPucATIo1s FOR HUMAN RIGrTs 5, 20 (2003).
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There are various meanings attached to the term onus probandi or burden of proof.9
It has been opined that the rules of burden of proof are no more than rebuttable
presumptions of law.o It is important, therefore, to engage in a discussion of the
various kinds of burdens of proof. This issue is also closely linked to the effect of
presumptions and reverses onus clauses, which are discussed in some detail in this
note.
Part II examines the various kinds of standards of proof. In order to understand the
standard of proof applied in India in criminal trials, it must be kept in mind that there
is no provision in the I.E.A. that lays down a particular standard of proof besides that
of the prudent man.11 The Malimath Committee has recommended that there be a
standard laid down in the statute itself and the standard recommended is that of 'clear
and convincing' proof. The jurisprudence developed by the Indian Courts thus far has
clearly incorporated the principles applied in the jury system of the U.K. and stated
that the guilt of the accused should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.12 The note
discusses the trends in various jurisdictions in order to understand fully the
importance of the different (but oft confused) concepts of burden of proof and
standard of proof. This discussion is even more relevant considering the fact that the
Malimath Committee recommendations are diametrically opposed to the view of the
Courts of various common law jurisdictions.
The note also questions the need to deviate from the strict standard imposed on the
prosecution. It is well accepted that the standard of proof that is imposed on the
prosecution is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the accused
only has to introduce reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case and prove the
exceptions or defences only on the balance of probabilities. It has been suggested that
this distinction is made since the State is much stronger than the individual and can

* 2 M.C SARKAR ET AL., SARKAR'S LAw oF EVIDENCE 1449 (1999) [hereinafter SARKAR].
' M. MONIR, PRINCUPLES AND DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1002 (1999) [hereinafter
MONIR.
n The relevant portion of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, 5 3, is: "Proved- A fact is said to
be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist,
or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."
1 The following oft quoted passage from Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C 462 illustrates the
importance of standard of proof in criminal law
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to
be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt ... If,
at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created
by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner... the
prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an
acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the
prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of
England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.
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generous.' 3

The author attempts to argue to argue that the standard of
afford to be
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not overly burdensome on the prosecution and that
it delicately balances the rights of the accused and the need to punish persons for
offences that they have committed.

II. BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Meaning of 'Burden of Proof
Before examining on whom the burden of proof lies in criminal cases, it is important
to understand what the phrase 'burden of proof' implies. Burden of proof relates to
the manner in which a case is tried, and by long usage has become the only reasonable
and natural method." It has been defined as follows: "On every issue, there is an
obligation on one party to convince the tribunal of the truth of some proposition of
fact which is in issue and which is vital to his case."' 5
The term burden of proof has two distinct meanings:16 Firstly, 'legal burden'7 which
may be used to indicate the burden of proof on the pleadings which means that it
rests on the party that asserts the affirmative of an issue.8 This is fixed at the
beginning of the trial and is settled as a question of law.19 Secondly, 'evidential

S.L. PHIPSON & D.W. ELLIOT, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 70 (11th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter PHIPSON].
14 JOHN JAY MCKELvEY, HANDBOOK IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 94 (5th ed. 1944)
[hereinafter McKELVEY]. It is the onus of proof that refers to the legal obligation on a
party to satisfy the fact-finder, to a specified standard of proof, that certain facts are true.
See also L. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 369 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter DENNIS].
15PIPSON, supra note 13, at 51. This embodies the Latin maxim et incumbit probation qui
decit, non qui negat. This was also stated in: Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v.
Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd., [1941] 2 All E.R 165. See also PHIL HUXLEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS: EVIDENCE 1-7 (1998) [hereinafter HUXLEY]; SARKAR, supra note 9, at 1445.
16 P.B. CARTER, CASES AND STATUTrES ON EVIDENCE 28 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter CARTER]
17 This has been called the 'probative burden' in DPP v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347.This
burden has also been described as 'major burden', 'establishing a case beyond reasonable
doubt', 'the risk of non-persuasion' and 'primary burden'. See W.H. Jarvis, Primary and
Secondary Burdens of Proofin CriminalLaw, 5 CRtM. L. Q. 425, 429 (1962) [hereinafter
Jarvis].
18 In order to determine the legal burden of proof, it is important to look at the affirmative in
the substance of the issue and not merely the form. See SIR JOHN WOODROFFE & SYED
AMIR Au, LAWOF EVIDENCE 2164 (16th ed. 1996) [hereinafter WOODROFFE]
'9 The burden of proof in this sense does not shift during the course of the triaL See PHIPSON,
supra note 13, at 52. The legal burden is on the party who will lose the case if the
proposition is not made out when all has been said and done.
13
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burden'20 that may also be used in the sense of adducing evidence in order to establish
a primafacie case upon which the accused may (not must) be found guilty if he does
not tender evidence to create a reasonable doubt.21 However, this is not considered to
be a correct meaning of burden of proof?' The effect of the prosecution not
discharging the evidential burden is that the charge is dismissed.23 The two aspects of
burden of proof that have been discussed hereinabove have been embodied in
sections 10124 and 10225 of LEA respectively.

B. Burden of Proof in case of Reverse Onus Clauses and Presumptions
There are certain legislations that may shift the evidential burden of proof on the
accused. In a criminal trial the evidential burden does keep shifting during the course
of the trial. However, it always lies on the prosecution in the first instance since it is
the prosecution that seeks to assert an affirmative to prove the guilt of the accused.
However, it may be possible that the statute requires the accused to prove certain facts
in the absence of which the Courts may draw a certain inference. This is in the nature
of a presumption which comes into play only after some elements of the offence have
been proved by the prosecution and therefore, it is submitted that it is incorrect to say
that the burden of proof is shifted under these legislations.
It is submitted that the Malimath Committee has confused the legal burden of proof
with the evidential burden of proof.26 The Malimath Committee Report states that
sections 105 to 114A of the I.EA. shift the burden of proof on the accused.27 This in
21

21

22

23
24

25

26
22

This burden is also known as 'minor burden', adducing evidence at a trial' 'or secondary
burden'. See Jarvis, supra note 17, at 430.
Once the prosecution has discharged the primafacie burden, it may be said that the burden
shifts on the accused to adduce evidence in his defence. However, the accused need not
discharge this burden for an acquittal since the persuasive burden of proving the case
beyond reasonable doubt remains on the prosecution at all times. The evidential burden
indicates the duty of going forward with the arguments either at the beginning of the case
or at any time during the trial, since this is a constantly shifting burden. See M.N. HOWARD
ET. AL., PHIPSONONEVIDENCE 58 (14th ed. 1990) [hereinafter HOWARD].
MCKELVEY, supra note 14, at 101.
Jarvis, supra note 17, at 432.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 101:
Burden of proof. - Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts,
must prove that those fads exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the
burden of proof lies on that person
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S 102; "On whom burden of proof lies - The burden of proof
in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on
cither side."
This confusion is evident in MAllMATHCOM4TEE RPORT, supra note 1, 15.6 -5.9.
Id.

5.6.
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the Malimath Committee's opinion marks a deviation from the cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove its case.
Reliance is placed by the Malimath Committee Report on Illustration(b) to section
10628 of the TEA in order to support the above proposition. The Malimath
Committee also refers to similar instances in special statutes as regards reverse onus
clauses.
Statutory presumptions, which place an evidential burden on the accused, requiring
the accused to do no more than raise a reasonable doubt, do not breach the
presumption of innocence. The Malimath Committee has rightly observed in the
Malimath Committee Report that such presumptions do not violate Art. 21 of the
Constitution of India.29 The Malimath Committee referred to a number of Supreme
Court decisions to support this proposition.30 Moreover, the Malimath Committee is
correct in so far as it points out that such statutory presumptions are not incompatible
with Art. 14(2) of the I.CCP.R" These presumptions should be considered in the
same light as common law evidential presumptions. These reverse onus clauses are a
necessary part of preserving the balance of fairness between the accused and the
prosecutor in matters of evidence.32
For example such a reverse onus clause may be found in sections 20 and 54 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 that lay down that a person
who is found in possession of illicit drugs has to prove that he has a licence to justify
such possession in the absence of which the presumption will stand and the accused
may be convicted even without the prosecution proving that the accused was in illegal
possession.'3
However, it is submitted that the Malimath Committee's interpretation of these
provisions is incorrect because of the following reasons-firstly, the legal burden always
remains on the prosecution and secondly, the standard of proof required of the
21 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, 5 106: "Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge -

29
30

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that
fact is upon him."
MAiDMATH CbMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1, 5.7.
K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) S.C.C. (Cri.) 734; Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, (1986) 2 S.CC. 486.

31

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.T.S.
171.

Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law.
32 R. v. DPP, [2000 1 Cr. App. RL 275.
33 Radhakisan Parashar v. State, 1988 Cri. L. J. 17, 18. However, in the case of reverse onus
clauses, in order for the presumption to come into play, it is important that the prosecution
first proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession and that the drug
that he was in possession of was an illicit drug, R v. Hunt, [19871 1 All E.R. 1.
44
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accused can never be beyond the balance of probabilities in a common law system
that seeks to protect the rights of the accused. At the same time, it would not be
incorrect to state that the effect of these provisions is that although the prosecution
has to prove certain elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
have to do so for all the ingredients of the offence. Therefore, the effect of the reverse
onus clause is such that the extent of the legal burden is altered.
Similar provisions are contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which
shifts the evidential burden of proof upon the accused when certain elements of the
offence under the relevant provisions have been proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.3 4 It is submitted that one of the primary problems in the Malimath
Committee Report lies in the logical inconsistency between paragraph 5.7 and
paragraph 5.8 of the Report.35
As has already been discussed, paragraph 5.7 refers merely to the evidential burden of
proof. However, the Malimath Committee Report relies on the shifting nature of
evidential burden of proof to assert that the legal burden on the prosecution to
establish its case beyond reasonable doubt may also shift during the trial. The
Malimath Committee Report has defined presumptions in paragraph 5.7 as: "Legal
devices whereby courts are entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that
there is no evidence or insufficient evidence."
Gearly this definition of 'presumption' indicates that Court exercises discretion in
applying the presumption because it is a power and not a duty of the Court. That is, it
is not mandatory to make the presumption. It is submitted that the mandatory nature
of the presumption depends on the policy considerations and the intention of the
legislature.36
'4

K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India, (1991) S.C.C (Cri.) 734. In the U.K., this position was
taken by the Gourt of Appeal in R v. Girdham, [19831 Cr. App. R. 34, 38.

3

The relevant portions of MALIMATH COMMI'TTEE REPORT, supra note 1,
follows:

1 5.8 are as

It is therefore clear that -proof beyond reasonable doubt" is not an absolute
principle of universal application and deviations can be made by the
legislature. Deviations can take different forms such as shifting the burden
of proof to the prosecution or prescribing a standard of proof lower than
"proof beyond reasonable doubt." As long as the accused has the

36

opportunity to adduce evidence to nullify the adverse effect such deviation
will not offend arts. 14 or 21 of the Constitution of India.
The term "presumption" has been defined by Thayer as "(an aid) to reasoning and
interpretation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given
inquiry. They may be grounded on general experience, or probability of any kind; or merely on
policy and convenience." See Jarvis, supra note 17, at 436. It has also been defined as "a
conclusion which may or must be drawn in the absence of contrary evidence." See PHIPSON,
supra note 13, at 75.
45
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It is further submitted that the cases discussed by the Malimath Committee in
paragraph 5.7 of the Malimath Committee Report refer to the constitutionality of
reverse onus clauses that merely shift the evidential burden on the accused. This
cannot be taken to indicate the Court's acceptance of shifting the legal burden on the
accused. It is submitted that contrary to the Malimath Committee's opinion, if the
legislature were to expressly shift the legal burden on the accused, it would not stand
the test of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. The presumption of innocence,
although not affected by shifting the evidential burden, is most certainly affected by
shifting the legal burden of proof. Therefore, the Malimath Comnittee Report is on
thin ice in suggesting that implementation of this recommendation will not be struck
down as unconstitutional.
This assumption of the Malimath Committee is also demonstrated in other parts of
the Malimath Committee Report37 where it is stated that there is a deviation from the
concept of presumption of innocence in socio-economic offences. Since the
presumption of innocence reflects the legal burden38 and not evidential burden, the
argument that deviation from this principle is constitutionally valid is quite clearly
erroneous.
Moreover, the Malimath Committee Report once again relies on the validity of
statutory presumptions to assert that the legislature is competent to lower the standard
of proof. The Malimath Committee relies upon section 4 of the Public Gambling Act,
1867 to state that under the statute the prosecution is not required to prove the
presence of the accused for the purposes of gambling.Y What the Malimath
Conunittee has not taken into account is the fact that the prosecution is still required
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the accused in the gambling house
although it is not required to prove the purpose of such presence. Therefore, a reverse
onus clause cannot completely do away with the legal burden contrary to what has
been suggested by the Malimath Conmmittee Report.40 Moreover, as has already been
suggested earlier in this note, a reverse onus clause may only alter the extent of the
legal burden but cannot affect its nature.

C. Shifting the Burden of Proofon the Accused
When one considers the first meaning of burden of proof as has been explained
above, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the burden of proof of satisfying the jury
of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is always upon the prosecution

37 MALIMATH COMMIT'EE REPORT,

supra note 1, 5.9.
The doctrine of presumption of innocence depends upon the doctrine of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. See Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., A.IR 1990 S.C 1459, 1467;
Dahyabhai v. State, AI.R. 1964 S.C 1563, 1566-1567.
3 MALiMATH COMUTTEE REPORT, supra note 1, 5.27.
0 Id. 15.27.
38
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and can never change. If a doubt exists, then the accused should be acquitted.4' The
presumption of innocence implies that the prosecution is required to prove every
ingredient of the offence, even though there may be negative avermentS42 made by
the prosecution.43 The burden of proof is never on the accused to prove his case or
disprove the prosecution's case. The legal burden remains on the prosecution to prove
every essential ingredient of the offence.44
The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to adduce evidence before the Court and
if it fails to introduce any or sufficient evidence, it is an established principle that
acquittal will follow.** However, if one considers the evidential burden, it constantly
shifts during the trial; the evidential burden may "shift" once the prosecution has
Mancini v. DPP, [1941] 3 All E.R 272, 279-280; Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] AC. 462,
482.
42 For example, in cases of murder, the burden of proving death, as a result of a voluntary act
of the accused and requisite mens rea on the part of the accused is on the prosecution.
Similarly on charges of rape the burden of proving non-consent by the prosecutrix is on the
prosecution. See Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., AI.R. 1990 S.C 1459, 1474.
o See R v. Errington Edwards, [1974] 59 Cr. App. R 213, 217.
49
WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 285 (12th ed. 1964); DENNIS, supra note 14, at 371. If it was to be
believed that the prosecution has established its case and that the onus was shifted on to
the accused to prove that he isn't guilty, it would go against the presumption of innocence
Therefore, a case is established beyond reasonable doubt only when the evidence tendered
by the prosecution and the accused, if any, is taken as a whole. See Jarvis, supra note 17, at
431. It has been opined that the burden of proof is constant and never shifts during the
course of the trial. It remains to the end on the party who asserted it at the outset. It is
important to keep in mind that when such an assertion is made, it refers to the legal burden
and not the evidential burden. The accused has to create a reasonable doubt once the
prosecution has established a prima facie case. The fact that the accused has to adduce
evidence (if he is not relying on the prosecution case to establish such reasonable doubt) to
create a reasonable doubt indicates that the burden of proceeding, that is the evidential
burden, has shifted on the accused. See MCKELVEY, supra note 14, at 100-101. However,
the Committee has relied upon the Privy Council decision in McIntosh v. Lord Advocate,
[2003] 1 AC. 1078 for the proposition that a legal burden may be shifted on the defendant
to rebut the assumptions, on the basis that it is not unreasonable or oppressive. It is
submitted that this case does not support the claim made by the Committee for several
reasons. Firstly, the case deals with sentencing procedure as opposed to a criminal trial and
cannot be relied upon to support the argument of the Committee. Secondly, the
assumption provided for in the statute did not deal with presumption of innocence. The
onus which was dealt with in the case was in respect of the source of income of the
defendant. Clearly, this would be within the particular knowledge of the accused. Thirdly,
this case dealt with shifting of the evidential burden and not of legal burden. Therefore, it is
submitted that the conclusions of the Malimath Committee based on interpretations in
respect of this case are incorrect.
4
The fact that evidence may be difficult to obtain or any other excuse including a hostile
witness does not and cannot relieve the prosecution from the burden of proof. See
MCKELVEY, supra note 14, at 97.
41
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made out a primafacie case against the accused and he may be convicted if he does
not adduce evidence to create a reasonable doubt.46 The accused bears the burden of
adducing evidence if he wishes to prevent adverse inferences being drawn from other
evidence, where that other evidence is relevant to an issue on which the prosecution
already bears the legal and evidential burdens.47

D. Burden of Proofin the case of Exceptions
As has been discussed already, the legal burden of proof always remains on the
prosecution but under section 105 of IE.A., the burden may shift upon the accused
to prove special circumstances when he takes the support of an exception or a
proviso. The most common illustration since the time of Woolmington is that of
insanity.49 The prosecution has to prove all the elements of the crime including the
required mens rea. However, the accused may rebut this by pleading insanity but the
burden of proof in this case is only one of balance of probabilities."o Even if the
accused is unable to establish his insanity, the evidence led by him may raise a
reasonable doubt as to the mens rea of the accused at the time of the commission of
the offence.?'

6
4
4

MCKELVEY, supra note 14, at 101.
DENNIS, supra note 14, at 372.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S 101: "Burden of proving that case of accused comes within

exceptions - When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence
of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions... is upon hin,
and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances."
' There have been suggestions that the exceptions in common law are restricted to insanity.
The reason for the shifting of the burden in the case of the defence of insanity is that
normally the presumption of mental capacity is sufficient to prove that the accused acted
consciously and voluntarily. The presumption is one of sanity, not responsibility Although
the prosecution need go no further to prove that the accused has mental capacity, it must
nevertheless discharge the legal burden of proving mens rea. See Bratty v. Att'y Gen. for
Northern Ireland, [1963] AC. 386. However, when one considers the cases of R v. Hunt,
[1987] 1 All E.R 1 and R v. Edwards, [1974] 2 All E.R 1085, there seems to be no reason
why an implied statutory exception may not be interpreted to go beyond the exception of
insanity. One may consider it dangerous to limit the exception to that of insanity since the
Indian Penal Code itself makes express provisions for other defenses and the burden
should be on the accused to prove that the exception or the defence that he pleads, should
apply to the case once the prosecution has discharged its obligation of proving all the
elements of the offence. Further, even in the U.S. the burden is on the accused when he
takes up the defence of duress, self-defence etc. See generally U.S. v. Bailey, 444 US. 394
(1980); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). However, it cannot be said that this is an
unshifting burden on the accused. See MoNIR, supra note 10, at 1047.
5 However, in U.S. v. Westcott, 83 F.3d 1354 (1996) it was held that the standard on the
defence for the purposes of proving insanity is that of clear and convincing proof.
51 Dahyabbai v. State, A.LR 1964 S.C 1563.
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It is clear from the definition of a presumption 52 that it frees the person in whose
favour it acts, from the evidential burden of adducing evidence in the first instance.5'
Sections 105 to 114A of I.E.A. deal with presumptions where the evidential burden is
shifted upon the accused. It may also be argued that in the absence of any evidence
adduced on either side, the presumption prevails in order to establish the truth of the
issue under consideration.54
III. STANDARD OF PROOF

A. Meaning of 'StandardofProof
The terms 'standard of proof' and 'quantum of proof' are usually used interchangeably
to refer to the size of the legal burden of proof. They specify the degree of persuasion
necessary for the legal burden to be discharged55 Accordingly, "A standard of proof
represents an attempt to instruct the fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication."56
There are three distinct standards of proof in common law as pointed out by the
Malimath Committee.57 The three types of standard of proof are firstly, persuasion on
the balance of probabilities. This standard of proof is usually placed on the parties in a
civil action. In a criminal trial, it is for the accused to prove the defence or exception
that he pleads on the balance of probabilities; secondly, proof beyond reasonable;
thirdly, standard of clear and convincing proof.

This has been discussed previously, see supra note 36.
5 WIGMORE has drawn a distinction between presumption of fact and presumption of law. In
its opinion, presumption of fact is a misnomer and should be discarded as useless.
14 However, the point to be remembered here is that the legal burden on the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt remains. The prosecution
cannot be freed from this burden by a mere presumption. See generally R v. Lambert,
[2002] 2 AC. 545. The Court further stated that in the case that a statute contained a
reverse onus clause, it is essential that keeping in mind the various human rights
conventions, the burden that is shifted should be read down from a legal burden to an
evidential burden. This position has been followed in R v. Mathews, [2003] 2 Cr. App. R
19; In the Matter of: Attorney General Reference, 2004 WL 742010. This was also held by
the European Court of Human Rights in Salabiak v. France, [1988] 13 EHRR 379.
5 P.B. CARTER, CASES AND STATUTES ON EVIDENCE 59 (2d ed. 1990).
56 In Re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970).
Riley Hill General Contractor. v. Tandy Corporation, 737 P.2d 595 (Oregon, 1987). In U.S.
v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (EDNY 1978), it was estimated that preponderance of the
evidence means some burden of proof over 50%. The test for clear and convincing proof
was deemed to be 70% juror certainty; clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence at least
80% juror certainty; and for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 95% certainty.
52
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B. Proofbeyond Reasonable Doubt
The doctrine of presumption of innocence rests upon the requirement that the
prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.58 The
presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn in favour of the accused. This
doctrine not only establishes his innocence at the beginning of the trial but also
continues to operate till sufficient evidence is adduced to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.59 The presumption of innocence is necessitated by the argument
that a contest between the state and the individual is one of unequals. Further, if the
burden were to be on the accused, then the Court would have to find the accused
guilty in spite of the fact that it may not be wholly convinced of his guilt.60
The standard of proof on the prosecution is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt6l
However, if the burden of an issue rests upon the accused, he is not required to meet
58

It represents the moral and political values that are fundamental to a liberal State. DENNIS,
supra note 14, at 374. See also Henry L. Chambers Jr., Reasonable Certainty and
Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 655, 671-672 (1998) [hereinafter Chambers] who
states (internal footnotes omitted):

Although termed a presumption, the presumption of innocence can be
considered both something less than an evidentiary presumption and
something more than an evidentiary presumption. Evidentiary presumptions
can take very different forms and serve different purposes. Presumptions,
weak or strong, require that an antecedent fact be proven before the
presumption is effective. The presumption of innocence requires no such
proof. Weak presumptions can be rebutted and their effect eliminated with
very little evidence. If the presumption of innocence only served a weak
presumption's limited purpose, and only required weak evidence of guilt
before it was rebutted, it would hardly be necessary at all and certainly
would not deserve the significance that has been attached to it. Because the
reasonable doubt standard requires that strong proof of defendant's guilt be
presented before conviction, a presumption of innocence that functioned as
a weak presumption would serve no purpose. Similarly, the presumption of
innocence is not a strong or conclusive presumption as that term is generally
understood. Once proven, conclusive presumptions cannot be rebutted.
Thus, the presumption of innocence is neither a strong nor weak
presumption.
5 U.S. v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950). This has also been incorporated in various human
rights conventions such as Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.TS. 171.
6
MCKELVEY, supra note 14, at 375-377; See also Prashanth Venkatesh & Balaji
Subramanian, Presumption ofInnocence in CriminalLaw, 3 CRIM. L.J 129, 129 (2000).
61 It has been held that a prima facie case made by the prosecution may be sufficient for
conviction if the accused has not rebutted the evidence that has been led by the
prosecution. Such a view is incorrect since the conviction has to be based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. One of the fundamental principles of criminal law is the presumption of
innocence and to require the accused to "rebut" the evidence implies that he has to prove
his innocence, which is contrary to the established principles of law.
s
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the high standards of proof and may merely lead evidence to meet the standard of
balance of probabilities to create a reasonable doubt in the evidence of the
prosecution. The onus of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt never shifts and
remains fixed upon the prosecution throughout the trial.62
The locus classicus on this point is undoubtedly the case of Woolmington v. DPP,63
where Lord Sankey laid down the principles of criminal law that have continued to be
accepted by Courts across common law jurisdictions to this day. The prosecution is
required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in order for the Court to convict
the accused. This was also held in Mancini v. DPP64 where the Court clarified
Woolmington by stating that if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the act was
"unintentional", an acquittal should follow since the benefit of the doubt always goes
to the accused in a criminal trial.65
The U.S. Supreme Court has also read this standard of proof required in a criminal
trial into the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.Y One may argue that the
requirement that the prosecution satisfy this standard of proof in India is a
constitutionally protected under Art. 21 of the Constitution.67 Deviation from this
standard by the legislature as recommended by the Malimath Committee is therefore
likely to be struck down as unconstitutional.
The Malimath Committee Report equates the French standard of inner conviction
with preponderance of probabilities. On this basis the Malimath Committee asserts
that lowering the standard of proof will not be in violation of Art. 14(2) of the
I.CCP.R68 The Malimath Committee Report does not provide any argument to
support the proposition that the standard of proof in France is in fact that of
preponderance of probabilities. It is submitted that since the argument itself is flawed,
the conclusion that the correct standard of proof in a criminal trial should not be one
of proof beyond reasonable doubt will not stand the test of Art. 21 of the
Constitution of India.
62
63

6
65
66

67

61

Mancini v. D.P.P., [1941]3 All ER 272; Woolmington v. D.P.P., [1935] A.C 462.
[1935] A.C 462.
[1941]3 Al E.R 272.
Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C 462,482.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Martin v.
Ohio, 480 US. 228 (1987). See also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET. AL., EVIDENCE UNDER
Ti-iE RULES 801-816 (4th ed. 2000).
The presumption of innocence has been held to be a human right. See Narendra Singh v.
State of MP., (2004) 10 S.CC 699. It has also been held that, CONST. OF INDIA art. 21 in
view of its expansive meaning not only protects life and liberty but also envisages a fair
procedure. See Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, J.T. 2005 (4) S.C
123.
MALIMATHCOMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1,

5.22.
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Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that the doubt should be imaginary or
unreal or improbable.69 Such doubts would not, and should not, be enough for an
acquittal7O since it would raise the standard of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' to
4proof beyond any doubt.' It has been held that doubts would be considered
reasonable only if they were free from an over- emotional response and should not be
"an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt."7 1 'Proof beyond reasonable doubt'
has been explained by Federal Judicial Center of Instruction of the U.S.72to mean that
the Court should be firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged.7 If there is a realpossibility that he is not guilty, the accused must be given
the benefit of the doubt and acquitted.7
The test as regards the standard of proof required in Indian Courts has been laid
down by section 3 of the .E.A which embodies the principle of accusare nemo se
debet, nisi coram deo.76 The meaning of 'proof' in section 3 of the I.E.A. is not
affected by the incidence of the burden proof and upon whom the burden lies to
adduce evidence before the Court.? Sections 101 to 104 of I.E.A. deal with the
question as to the person on whom the burden of proof lies and not with the extent
of the standard of proof.
69

70
71

72

73

The level of proof required is definitely not one of proof beyond a shadow of doubt since
this would mean that the Courts cannot allow even the remotest uncertainty. See Miller v.
Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All E.R 372, 373-374. 'fTie distinction between scientific
proof and legal proof has to be kept in mind in order to understand what is meant by
"proof beyond reasonable doubt". See R v. Bracewall, [1979] 68 Cr. App. Rt 44, 51.
Unreasonable doubt is based on the possibility that nonexistent evidence may explain a
defendant's actions and lead to his acquittal. See QIAMBERS, supra note 58, at 670. See also
COLuN TAPPER, CRoss AND TAPPER ON EvIDENCE 140 (9th ed. 1999).
See Pershadi v. State, A.I.R. 1955 AIL 443, 461.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Gopal, A.I.R. 1988 S.C 2154, 2161. A criminal justice
system requiring absolute certainty for conviction would be ineffectual. Guilty verdicts would
require that a juror believe that absolutely no possibility of innocence existed. CHAMBERS, supra
note 58, at 660.
The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education agency of the federal judicial
system of the U.S. It was established by Congress in 1967, on the recommendation of the
judicial Conference of the US. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER at
http://www.fjc.gov (last visited June 9, 2005)
This standard is virtually identical to the standard used in France. See Lawrence Solan,
Refocussing the Burden of Proofin CriminalCases: Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt, 78
Tax. L REv. 105, 106 (1999).

74

A modified version of this direction was applied in State v. Medina, 685 Ai2d 1242 (New

Jersey, 1996).
71

Pattern Criminaljury Instructionsfor the District Courts of the First Circuit,available at
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/Pattern2003/html/patt4cfo.htm (last visited July

7, 2004).
supra note 18, at 2156.
Mohammad Yunus v. Emperor, A.I.R 1923 Cal. 517

76 WOODROFFE,
'7
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Section 3 of I.E.A. merely requires the test of the prudent man to be applied. The
Malimath Committee has equated the prudent man standard to the standard of
preponderance of probabilities?8 However, according to the author, section 3 of
LEA cannot be read in isolation of other aspects of criminal jurisprudence. The
criminal justice system jealously protects the rights of the accused; this owes its origin
to the presumption of innocence as has already been discussed. Therefore, in a
criminal trial, the prudent man test is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further,
the prudent man test should also be applied to determine the reasonability of the
doubt that needs to be present for an acquittaLn
The Malimath Committee states that the standard of proof prescribed in section 3 of
the I.E.A. is applicable to civil cases alone and not to criminal trials. In the Malimath
Committee's opinion, the higher standard of proof in criminal trials has been laid
down by judicial decisions alone.O It is submitted that this is an incorrect proposition.
The judicial decisions have laid down the higher standard of proof in criminal trials
keeping in mind the requirements of section 3 of the I.E.A; it is only prudent that a
higher standard of proof be applied in a criminal trial. Incidentally, the

78

MAIMATH COMMHTTEE REPORT, supra note 1, 5.26.

This follows from the prudent man test in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 3 read with the
following statement made by the English Court in Rt v. Lambert, [2002] 2 A.C 545:
The principle which is to be applied requires a balance to be struck between
the general interest of the community and the protection of the fundamental
rights of the individual. This will not be achieved if the reverse onus
provision goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the objective of the
statute.
See also McIntosh v. Lord Advocate, [2003] 1 A.C 1078, 1082.
so MAUMATH GOMMITWE REPORT, supra note 1, 15.12.
7
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very same point is made in State of West Bengal v. OrilalJaiswal, which is referred
to later in the Malimath Committee Report
In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra,8 Justice Krishna Iyer warned
against the artificial meaning given to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The Malimath Committee Report84 relies on this decision of the Supreme Court to
point out the problems that may exist with the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt." However, all that the Supreme Court has said is that the standard of proof is
that of proof beyond reasonable doubt and not of proof beyond any doubt.
Moreover, the Malimath Committee has not taken into account decisions like Kali
Ram v. State of H.P.,86 which have clarified this position and stated that the

81

(1994) 1 S.CC 73, 89-90 where the Court observed:

We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter
than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however
intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made
against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the
requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures.
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered
even after the introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C (sic)and S. 113A (sic) of Indian
Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the
complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be
borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial
and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been
proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the
case and the materials placed on record.
12 MALIMATH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1,

15.18.

83 (1973) S.CC (Cri.) 1033, 1039; State of West Bengal v. Mohammad Omar, 2000 S.CC.
(Cri.) 1516, 1525.
1 MALIMATH-COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1, 5.16.
85 However it is interesting to refer to the context in which this statement was made by the
Supreme Court:
The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social
defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of
justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary
context of escalating crime and escape... The cherished principles or golden thread of proof
beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched
morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude
reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall
not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused.
86 (1973) S.C.GC (Crk) 1048.
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adversarial criminal system requires that the presumption of innocence not be read
down?
Moreover, the Malimath Committee observes:8S "There is considerable subjective
element involved in coming to the conclusion that the doubt is a reasonable one. In
the process, instead of focussing on discovering the truth, attention Is drawn to the
doubts and about their reasonableness." It is submitted that this statement by the
Malimath Committee is inherently fallacious on two counts: Firstly, there is no place
for any subjective element since the test of the prudent man in section 3 of the I.E.A.
is clearly an objective test. Secondly, it is unclear how considering the 'reasonableness
of the doubt' is not a step in the process of discovering the truth; after all, truth does
not merely involve conviction of the guilty but more importantly requires that the
innocent be acquitted. Therefore, the very premise on which the Malimath Committee
has based its recommendation to lower the standard of proof is erroneous.

C. 'Clear and Convincing Proof
The concept of "clear and convincing proof" has been developed in US. in the cases
of certain socio-economic offences. The Malimath Committee refers to the standard
of clear and convincing proof applied in cases of fraud in U.S.8 Without suggesting
why this standard should be applied in India for all criminal offences, the Malimath
Committee has made the above suggestion. Moreover, there have been no cases that
have discussed what exactly this standard of proof indicates. Therefore, it appears that
to apply this standard to the Indian criminal jurisprudence would only create more
problems because of this lack of clarity regarding this concept.
The Malimath Committee relies on the French inquisitorial system to assert that the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not of universal application.9o However,
the written report submitted by the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre
to the U.N. points out that in its discussion of the French inquisitorial system, the
Malimath Committee fails to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the
underlying ideology, structure, history and political context that produced the criminal
justice system that exists in France today.91

S7

The idea that the benefit of doubt always belongs to the accused was reiterated in State of
Rajasthan v. Ani, 1997 S.CC (Cri.) 851; State of West Bengal v. Mohanmad Omar, (2000)
S.CC (Cr.) 1516, 1525.

8

MAllMATH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, 15.16.

90

521.
Id. 5.22.

91

Written Statement of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre circulated by

9 Id.

Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/2004/NGO/130, available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Hridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2004.NGO.130.En?Opendocumen
t. (last visited July 8, 2004) [hereinafter Written Statement of the South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Centre].
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The Malimath Committee recommends that the standard of "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" be replaced by the standard of the court being convinced that the
fact is true: "In criminal cases, unless otherwise provided, a fact is said to be proved
when, after considering the matter before it, the Court is convinced that it is true" it
states. In India, it has been held that in a case of fraud or dishonest misappropriation
of property under section 403 of the I.P.C, the rules of criminal law will apply and the
charge against the accused has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Fraud cannot
be established on the basis of suspicion and conjecture. 2 However, one has to
consider the observations made by certain eminent authors that the required degree of
conviction is proportional to the seriousness of the charge.9 Therefore, "reasonable
doubt" may vary according to the charge against the accused. In the case of socioeconomic offences, it is possible that a "mere" doubt is insufficient to displace a
conviction. However, it would be difficult to quantify such a degree since in the case
of dishonest misappropriation of property, the seriousness of the charge as well as the
amount of money that the accused is alleged to have embezzled will become relevant
for the standard that is to be applied.
However, the danger lies in making this standard applicable to all cases since, as is
evident; the standard is lowered only because of the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case. Therefore, as has already been discussed, the test of the prudent man
embodied in section 3 of I.EA should be read to determine the kind of doubt that
would determine whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the legal burden on the prosecution to establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt should not be altered.

92
9

Narayanan v. Official Assignee, A.I.R 1941 P.C 93.
PIPSON, supra note 13, at 72. This is also evident from the case of State of West Bengal v.
Oriwal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 S.CC 73. It is submitted that this is the correct interpretation of
the judgment rather than that provided in MAuMATH COMNUrTTEE REPORT, supra note 1,
5.18. In R v. Hunt, [1987] A.C 352, 374, it was held that other factors should also be
considered such as the mischief at which the provision was aimed and practical
considerations such as the ease or difficulty for the respective parties of discharging the

burden of proof. To reach this finding, the Court relied on Woolmington v. DPP, [1935]
AC 462; Mancini v. DPP, [1942] AC. 1; Nimmo v. Cowan (Alexander) & Sons, [1968]
9

A.C 107; Rv Edwards, [1974] 2 All E.R 1085.
This follows from the decision in R v. Lambert, [2002] 2 A.C 545, 555 where the Court
held that the balance should be struck between the general interests of the community and
the rights of the accused. This has also been stated in Brown v. Scott, [2003] 1 AC. 681,
704. The South African Constitutional Court stated this in State v. Coetzee, [1997] 2 L.RC
593 cited from DENNIS, supra note 14, at 375.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be stated that the legal burden of proof remains constant and is
affected only by reverse onus clauses that change the nature of the legal burden to the
extent that all the ingredients of the offence do not have to be proved by the
prosecution. However, such reverse onus clauses are usually limited to strict liability
offences. Even if the statute seeks to place the legal burden on the accused, it has to
be read down so that only the evidential burden is shifted upon the accused. Similarly,
even in the case of presumptions, exceptions and provisos, although sections 105 to
114A of LEA. shift the burden of proof to the accused, the burden is only that of
evidential burden of proof. The presumptions against the accused are rebuttable and
therefore, the legal burden is never shifted upon the accused.
In the UK. and US. the confusion in respect of the phrase "beyond reasonable
doubt" has arisen only because of the directions that are given to the jury by the
judge.95 However, it is generally accepted that the standard of proof is that of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In the Indian context, since there is no jury system, the
judges do not need to define the phrase and may act on the objective basis of a
reasonable man to determine whether a doubt is reasonable. Here it is apt to quote
Lord Justice Denning who relied on Chief Justice Best: "in proportion as the crime is
enormous, so ought the proof to be clear".96
The phrase seems to have been interpreted by some judges to mean proof beyond any
doubt. However, it is submitted that these are mere aberrations and do not imply that
the standard should be lowered. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is
important in order to safeguard the rights of the accused at trial. The standard of clear
and convincing evidence is ambiguous and has been applied only in the cases of socioeconomic offences such as fraud in U.S. This is because such offences have both civil
and criminal elements. To apply this standard to all offences under criminal law would
be to tear apart the foundations of criminal law.
The Malimath Committee proposes to do away with the presumption of innocence
and lower the standard of proof, which will violate the presumption of innocence, as
enshrined in Art. 14(2) of the I.CQP.R and other human rights conventions.9 7 The
1 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994); U.S. v. Vavlitis, 9 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 1993); U.S. v.
Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cr. 1989).
96 Bater v. Bater, [1951] P. 35, 37. Although this was a divorce proceeding,
Lord Justice
Denning observed that the phrase "reasonable doubt" may be used in a divorce as well as
in a criminal case but in the former could not be interpreted with the same strictness as the

97

standard required in a criminal case. He went on to state that even in a criminal
prosecution, the standard varies according to the crime. For a similar view, see Vijayee
Singh v. State of UP., A.I.R. 1990 S.C 1459, 1476.
Written Statement of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 91.
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Malimath Committee Report's focus is on arming the state with more discretionary
and punitive measures, weakening the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused, relaxing the presumption of innocent until proven guilty which is
recommended as the surest way of creating a better criminal justice system.98
Therefore, it is submitted that the recommendations of the Malimath Comrmittee as
regards shifting the burden of proof on the accused in certain cases and lowering the
standard of proof to clear and convincing proof is misguided. The rights of the
accused are clearly an important part of the entire criminal justice system and
therefore, to abrogate these in the manner that has been suggested by the Malimath
Committee Report attacks the very root of the system. The Malimath Committee
merely required making suggestions keeping in mind the fundamental principles of
criminal jurisprudence in the Constitution of India. It has gone beyond its mandate in
proposing reforms that are clearly unconstitutional.
The legal burden of proof should obviously lie on the prosecution to prove what it
asserts and moreover, considering the gravity of the consequences of a criminal trial, it
is only fair to expect the State to prove its contention beyond reasonabledoubt. The
Malimath Committee Report fails to consider the fact that although certain judicial
decisions have deviated from these principles, these are only but aberrations to the
rule that have been made considering the specific facts and circumstances of the case.

* Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Presumed to be Guilty, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 20, 2003, availableat

http://www-countercurrents.org/hr- mehta201103.hitm (last visited June 9, 2005).
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